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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the origins and effects of occupational licensing regulation in late nineteenth
and early twentieth century America. Was licensing regulation introduced to limit competition in
the market for professional services at the expense of efficiency? Or was licensing adopted to reduce
informational asymmetries about professional quality? To investigate these hypotheses, we analyze
the determinants of licensing legislation and the effect of licensing on entry into eleven occupations.
We also examine the impact of medical licensing laws on entry into the medical profession,
physician earnings, mortality rates, and the incidence of medical malpractice. We believe that, at
least for the Progressive Era, the evidence is more consistent with the asymmetric information
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Not long ago, the Governor of a midwestern state was approached by representatives of 
a particular trade anxious to enlist the Governor’s support in securing passage of 
legislation to license their trade. 
  “Governor,” the men said, “passage of this licensing act will ensure that only 
qualified people will practice this occupation; it will eliminate charlatans, incompetents 
or frauds; and it will thereby protect the safety and welfare of the people of this state.” 
  The governor, from long experience, was somewhat skeptical. “Gentlemen,” he 
asked, “are you concerned with advancing the health, safety and welfare of the people 
under the police powers of the state, or are you primarily interested in creating a 
monopoly situation to eliminate competition and raise prices?” 
  The spokesman for the occupational group smiled and said, “Governor, we’re 




  The late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries witnessed the birth of 
modern day professions. Prior to the late 1800s, only medicine, law and theology were 
considered “learned professions” (Friedman and Kuznets 1945). The growth of modern 
day professions was fueled not only by a transformation of these older professions but 
also by a significant increase in new professional occupations such as teachers, engineers, 
dentists, and accountants to list a few. In 1900, a little over 4 percent of the labor force 
was engaged in professional and technical occupations; that figure rose steadily to about 
20 percent in 2000 (US Department of Commerce 2001). 
  Professionals differ from ordinary laborers in a variety of ways. Compared to 
other types of workers, professionals acquire more advanced levels of training and 
education, earn higher wages, and generally possess greater status in society. In addition, 
unlike most occupations, entry into and standards of practice within professional 
occupations are regulated by professional societies and by government. Most often, 
professions are self-regulated. Professional societies regulate their own practice by 
determining standards of entry and by developing a code of ethics. Local and state 
governments often delegate the regulatory powers of professional licensing to 
representatives of the professions themselves. 
  For many economists, the regulation of entry by professional societies and local 
and state governments is primarily motivated by a profession's interest in "creating a 
monopoly situation to limit competition and raise prices." Ever since the classic study by 
Friedman and Kuznets (1945), economists have generally believed that the wages of   4
physicians and other professionals are often artificially raised by regulation. The 
dominant view today is that the regulatory process has been captured by industry to erect 
entry restrictions for its own benefit (Stigler 1971). Indeed, most scholars who have 
analyzed the effects of occupational licensing regulation argue that the evidence supports 
of some version of the capture theory (Friedman 1962; Moore 1964; Holen 1965; 
Benham, Maurizi and Reder 1968; Kessel 1970, 1972; Maurizi 1974; Benham and 
Benham 1975; Leffler 1978; Pashigian 1979; White 1980; Fraundorf 1984; Burnstein and 
Cromwell 1985; Noerther 1986; Svorney 1987; Graddy 1991). 
  However, there is an alternative explanation. The sale and purchase of 
professional services are often subject to problems of asymmetric information.
1 More 
often than not, sellers of specialized services are better informed than buyers about the 
various dimensions of product quality. When informational asymmetries are significant, 
then the classic “lemons” problem may arise as lower quality goods drive out higher 
quality goods from the market (Akerlof 1970). Thus, professionals may choose to self-
regulate, or professionals and consumers may seek government regulation to "eliminate 
charlatans, incompetents or frauds" and "protect the safety and welfare" of consumers 
(Arrow 1963; Leland 1979; Weingast 1980). In this instance, regulation may increase the 
wages of professionals, not because it limits competition at the expense of efficiency, but 
because it improves the quality of services that consumers expect to receive. 
  Yet despite the existence of a plausible alternative explanation for why 
professions are regulated, most scholars have not taken this thesis very seriously. We 
know of no empirical study of professional licensing regulation that is based on 
                                                 
1 While there are numerous definitions of the term “professions,” most definitions seem to suggest that 
professions sell specialized services whose product quality is difficult to verify ex ante by the buyer. 
According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary (1997, p. 585) a profession is “a calling requiring 
specialized knowledge and often long academic training.” Taking this definition a step further, William 
Rothstein (1972, p. 8) argues that a profession is “a manner of earning a livelihood through the application 
of a body of highly abstract knowledge in some set of institutions.” An even more detailed definition of the 
word “profession” has been offered by Paul Starr, who writes (1982, p. 15): “A profession… is an 
occupation that regulates itself through systematic, required training and collegial discipline; that has a base 
in technical, specialized knowledge; and that has a service rather than a profit orientation enshrined in its 
code of ethics.” It is also interesting to note that the U.S. judges ultimately classified medical malpractice 
suits as torts rather than contracts. Judges ruled that a “meeting of minds” was not possible between a 
physician and a patient. Contracts between physicians and patients were not possible because the latter 
lacked the necessary knowledge to bargain equally. However, physicians could be sued under torts defined 
broadly as “private civil wrongs that violate certain duties or responsibilities.” See Kenneth De Ville 
(1990).   5
informational asymmetries. In many respects, this is not surprising: in practice, it is very 
difficult to develop empirical tests that clearly distinguish the two hypotheses for 
professional regulation. In fact, most empirical evidence presented in favor of the capture 
hypothesis is observationally equivalent with the asymmetric information hypothesis. 
Studies typically find that licensing is correlated negatively with entry and positively with 
earnings. Additionally, studies also find that the occupational group being licensed is an 
important constituency in favor of regulation. However, scholars often fail to note that 
these correlations are predicted by both theories of professional regulation. 
  The two theories do have some sharp predictive differences. If government 
regulation is adopted to solve problems of asymmetric information, then licensing should 
improve the quality of services. On the other hand, if licensing regulation is a result of 
industry capture, then the quality of services should be unchanged, or may even 
deteriorate as competition is reduced. Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to obtain 
information on the quality of services provided by professionals.
2 Unlike the output of 
manufacturing, the output of services is difficult to measure and quantify.
3 Wages are 
often used as a measure of value added for services. However, for professional services, 
wages may be a poor measure of value added since, as we noted earlier, they can be 
artificially inflated through regulation.  
  We explore in this paper the causes and consequences of state government 
occupational licensing regulation in the United States during the Progressive Era. This 
period witnessed not only a sharp increase in professionals in numerous occupations, but 
also a surge in state licensing legislation for professions and trades. By the mid-twentieth 
century, there were more than 1,200 state occupational licensing statutes, averaging 25 
per state, for at least 75 occupations ranging from physicians to embalmers. Typically, 
licensing boards were created to control entry into an occupation and to enforce standards 
of practice among licensed practitioners. However, the form and content of licensing 
                                                 
2 A handful of scholars have examined the relationship between licensing and proxies for professional 
quality using contemporary data. See Caroll and Gaston (1981), Feldman and Begun (1985) and Haas-
Wilson (1986).  
3 The problems of measuring the output of services are addressed in Fuchs (1969).   6
legislation differed greatly across occupations, states and time. In many occupations, the 
qualifications for licensure were raised and tightened over the years.
4 
  We examine state licensing regulations of eleven occupations between 1880 and 
1930.
5 For these occupations, we study the various factors that led to the adoption of 
licensing regulation, and whether the introduction of licensing restricted entry into these 
occupations. When we estimate a discrete time hazard model of the adoption of licensing 
for the pooled data on eleven occupations, we find that urbanization was a major factor in 
the enactment of licensing regulation, as was the size of the occupational group. When 
the model is estimated for specific occupations, the urbanization rate is significant for 
architects, attorneys, physicians and veterinarians. For barbers, beauticians, dentists, 
engineers, nurses, physicians, plumbers and veterinarians, a greater representation of their 
workforce in a given state increased the probability of adopting licensing legislation. 
However, when we estimate the impact of licensing legislation on entry, we find that 
licensing legislation did not restrict entry into most occupations. Licensing regulations 
appear to have restricted entry into only four professions: architects, dentists, physicians 
and veterinarians. In general, except for these four occupations, it appears that licensing 
requirements were either too weak or licensing boards too ineffective to limit entry into 
most occupations in our sample.  
  At least for the Progressive Era, we believe that the overall evidence on licensing 
gathered in this paper is more consistent with the asymmetric information hypothesis than 
the industry capture story. In this period, information asymmetries for consumers 
increased markedly as society became more specialized and urbanized. As growth in 
scientific knowledge was accompanied by specialization, individuals became less 
knowledgeable about the goods and services they purchased in the marketplace. 
Moreover, as society became urbanized, market exchanges became more anonymous so 
that traditional mechanisms for overcoming the asymmetric information problem were 
less useful. Not surprisingly, licensing regulations were more likely to be adopted in 
states with significant urban populations.  
                                                 
4 See Council of State Governments (1952). 
5 Occupations in our sample include architects, attorneys, barbers, beauticians, dentists, engineers, nurses, 
physicians, plumbers, teachers and veterinarians.   7
  Furthermore, licensing regulations seem to have been stricter for those 
occupations where informational asymmetries were most troubling to consumers. 
Consumers are more likely to be concerned with informational asymmetries when they 
purchase services directly from professionals and when the consequences of poor 
purchases are great. Consumers are less likely to be concerned with regulating 
professions such as engineers and nurses because they are mostly hired by firms rather 
than consumers, and are also less likely to be concerned with regulating professions such 
as barbers and beauticians because the costs of a bad haircut are relatively low.
6 We do 
not believe that it is merely a coincidence that the entry and standards of practice are 
most strictly regulated for physicians, dentists, and veterinarians, whose services are 
purchased directly by consumers and where the costs of receiving poor services could be 
high and sometimes even catastrophic.
7  
  To delve more deeply into whether Progressive Era licensing regulation was 
introduced to reduce information asymmetries or to limit competition, we analyze the 
medical profession in greater detail. We collect detailed information on specific licensing 
regulations to examine what types of regulations were most effective in regulating entry. 
Since licensing regulations were rarely static, especially for physicians, it is important to 
determine what types of regulations had the most significant impact on entry. Indeed, we 
investigate not only how the evolution of licensing standards affected entry, but also 
whether licensing affected the earnings of physicians and the quality of physicians’ 
services. In particular, we examine whether medical licensing lowered mortality rates and 
the incidence of medical malpractice suits or whether it merely restricted entry into the 
medical profession and raised physician incomes.  
  We find that those licensing regulations that had the most negative impact on 
entry were also those that were most likely to increase physician quality. A close analysis 
of the effects of specific state medical licensing requirements on the number of 
physicians per capita shows that the licensing regulations that most sharply reduced entry 
were those that increased the length of the medical degree and increased the length of 
                                                 
6 For example, the American Machinist wrote that a code of ethics was unnecessary for engineers as 
compared to doctors and lawyers since few engineers were independent consultants: “The employer [of the 
engineer] is the final judge of the manner in which his money shall be spent. He is usually more or less of 
an engineer himself, and frequently a competent one” (quoted in Calvert 1967, p. 267).   8
pre-medical college education.
8 However, unlike Friedman and Kuznets (1945), we do 
not find that licensing regulation raised physician incomes, either absolutely or relative to 
dentists. We also find that licensing regulation reduced mortality rates from illnesses 
where the quality of physicians is likely to have made a difference during this period. 
While states with stricter licensing regulations did not have lower overall mortality rates 
or lower mortality rates due to cancer and diabetes, they did have significantly lower 
rates of infant, maternal and appendicitis mortality.  
  Not all of the consequences of licensing were in the general interests of practicing 
physicians. If physicians were unified in their desire for licensing regulation, they were 
also unified in their opposition to the growth of medical malpractice suits during this 
period. Surprisingly, we find that licensing increased rather than reduced the incidence of 
state appellate malpractice suits. It appears that medical licensing regulations, by better 
defining the standards of local practice, made it easier for consumers to successfully sue 
physicians for poor outcomes.
9 Since licensing regulations were unlikely to eliminate all 
unqualified physicians, malpractice suits may have raised the costs of operation for less 
skilled physicians. However, because even qualified physicians were threatened by the 
potential for frivolous lawsuits, physicians did not find it in their collective interests to 
defend the rights of consumers to sue physicians.  
   While it is extremely difficult to rule out the importance of the industry capture 
explanation for professional regulation, we urge scholars to pay greater attention to 
motivations based on asymmetric information. The desire to eliminate charlatans and 
quacks from a given profession is more than mere rhetoric for both the practitioner and 
the consumer. However, we are fully aware that if professionals are granted powers to 
limit entry into their own professions, then the potential for misusing the state for private 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 Architects are an exception to this explanation. 
8 Friedman and Kuznets (1945) report that acceptance rates at medical schools between 1926 and 1941 
were near 60% where as the passing rate for licensing was around 96%. For dental schools in 1941, the 
acceptance rate was over 83% whereas the licensing passing rate was a little over 80%. However, it would 
be erroneous to believe that medical schools rather than licensing regulation were responsible for restricting 
entry into medicine. It is more likely that medical schools, as compared to dental schools, internalized 
licensing restrictions into their admissions decisions and did not accept unqualified applicants in order to 
preserve their reputations. Most scholars believe that stricter licensing regulation was the binding constraint 
on the number of physicians admitted to the profession. See, for instance, Starr (1982). 
9 See Smith (1941a-d) and De Ville (1990) for general discussions on the rise of malpractice suits in the 
United States over the nineteenth century.    9
gain is always present. Indeed, the fundamental dilemma of licensing regulation is that it 
can improve efficiency, or limit competition, or do “a little of each.” 
 
II. The Growth of Professions and the Emergence of Occupational Licensing 
  Scientific knowledge expanded tremendously during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. The scope and depth of human understanding about the physical, social, and 
biological world underwent a massive expansion during these centuries. Not only did the 
total stock of knowledge grow, but scientific knowledge became increasingly specialized 
(Price 1963). This expansion of specialized knowledge is illustrated in Tables 1 and 2 
which present data on the number of scientific periodicals published in a variety of 
disciplines from the eighteenth century until the mid-twentieth century.
10 The data reveal 
a dramatic increase in the number of scientific periodicals published over time and an 
increase in the number of field-specific scientific journals. 
Over time, this new scientific knowledge found applications in occupations like 
medicine, dentistry, architecture, and engineering. For instance, advances in chemistry, 
physics, and geology during the nineteenth century made it possible to develop 
specialized fields within engineering. Specialized engineering fields like chemical, 
mechanical, electrical, geological and metallurgical engineering thus gradually came into 
being. A systematic understanding of increasingly specific scientific disciplines became 
part of the training of new engineers (Society for the Promotion of Engineering 
Education 1930). Meanwhile in medicine, the development of basic biological sciences 
like bacteriology, microbiology, immunology, and biochemistry, made it possible for 
physicians to identify the sources of particular diseases. While significant improvement 
in the ability of physicians to treat many of these diseases only emerged gradually, a 
systematic understanding of the biological sciences became important for the training of 
physicians, veterinarians, dentists, and other health workers (Flexner 1910; Ludmerer 
1985).    
                                                 
10 The data displayed in Table 1 are taken from Gascoigne (1985), who surveyed and categorized by 
scientific field approximately 900 scientific periodicals published in Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and the 
United States throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Our estimates of the number of periodicals 
published in each discipline in the mid-twentieth century (Table 2) are taken from Fowler (1966), who 
compiled a list of periodical guides for a variety of academic and professional fields as well as information 
on the number of periodicals included within each guide.   10
  The consequences of this explosion of specialized knowledge were twofold. First, 
it became increasingly difficult to be a successful generalist. While it may have been 
possible in the 1500s for an exceptional individual like Leonardo da Vinci to be an 
engineer, architect, and physician, it was clearly not feasible to be a master of more than 
one of these fields by the early 1900s. Therefore, within particular academic disciplines, 
as well as within particular occupations, specialists emerged who possessed a deeper 
knowledge of a more specific subject area or application. Second, the benefits of longer 
and longer periods of formal education increased the pre-requisite knowledge base 
needed to gain a mastery of certain fields. Completion of primary or even secondary 
schooling and mastery of “reading, writing, and arithmetic” ceased to furnish an adequate 
educational background for increasingly specialized and scientific occupations. 
Universities, colleges, and other institutions of higher learning therefore emerged to 
educate individuals who wanted to acquire the knowledge and skills to work in 
occupations where the growth of relevant knowledge was greatest. 
  The expansion of specialized knowledge and the emergence of “experts” or 
“professionals” during the late 1800s and early 1900s gave rise to significant changes in 
the nature of the markets for the services offered by these professionals. In the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the bulk of the population lived in rural areas 
or in relatively small towns. While many of the services offered by physicians, dentists, 
and other professionals were subject to uncertainty, in traditional small town markets, 
local reputations could play an important role in solving the asymmetric information 
problem. According to Starr (1982) and Rothstein (1972), markets for physician services 
during the colonial and early antebellum periods were relatively thin. There were 
generally very few physicians in each town, and high transportation costs made it 
impractical to go beyond one’s local community in search of medical care. Accordingly, 
simple reputation mechanisms could work reasonably well in helping consumers evaluate 
physician quality. 
  As the nineteenth century progressed, however, falling transportation costs 
brought about the integration of the national economy, which in turn contributed to 
regional specialization and urbanization (Kim 1995, 1998, 2000). This movement of the 
population out of the countryside and into increasingly dense cities was accompanied by   11
the rise of impersonal exchange as the dominant form of market interaction. 
Specialization and the rise of impersonal exchange created problems for producers and 
consumers in a wide variety of markets. In the food industry, for instance, urbanization 
and the rise of impersonal markets for foodstuffs contributed to growing uncertainty 
about food quality, since consumers knew less and less about how their food was 
produced and what was added to it (Law 2003). For sellers of professional services, the 
rise of impersonal market exchange posed similar problems since local reputations 
became less effective as exchange became increasingly anonymous. Membership in key 
professional societies or associations may have been a partial substitute for local 
reputation, but in an environment where professional societies were proliferating in 
nearly every occupation, and the requirements for membership in these societies were 
often very low, the signaling value associated with membership in any given society may 
not have been particularly high (Rothstein 1972). Consequently it became increasingly 
difficult for professionals to establish a reputation for good service.  
  Specialization and the rise of impersonal exchange in the market for professional 
services were accompanied by a sudden surge in state government occupational licensing 
regulation.
11 As shown in Table 3, while state governments began to regulate some 
occupations as early as the 1870s, most occupational licensing laws were adopted in the 
first two decades of the 1900s.  Some occupations were regulated earlier than others. 
Physicians and dentists were among the earliest occupations to be regulated as licensing 
                                                 
11 Occupational licensing in America did not begin in the late 1800s. During the colonial period and into 
the early nineteenth century, state governments regulated the practice of law and medicine in various ways. 
Nevertheless, occupational licensing on a wide scale did not begin until the late nineteenth century. In the 
latter half of the 1800s and continuing through the first half of the 1900s, state governments throughout 
America enacted legislation that regulated a wide variety of occupations. While the substance of these 
regulations varied from occupation to occupation and from state to state, in general these laws set standards 
determine what it would involve to become a qualified practitioner of a particular occupation. In some 
instances, these laws also made it illegal for those who did not meet these standards to practice particular 
occupations. This second wave of licensing regulation differed from colonial licensing laws in several 
ways. First, it applied to a wider variety of occupations than medicine and law; the licensing statutes 
enacted in the late 1800s and early 1900s included occupations ranging from barbers and beauticians to 
architects, engineers, and dentists. Second, the requirements that were established by these regulations were 
generally stricter than those that were in place during the colonial era. Although colonial era licensing laws 
generally did not preclude unlicensed individuals from practicing law or medicine, in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, a license was usually a pre-requisite to practice a given occupation. Third, the 
enforcement of these more recent regulations was more vigilant than in the colonial era. Indeed, 
enforcement of these laws was generally placed in the hands of independent or state licensing boards, 
whose members were largely drawn from the occupational group being licensed. See Council of State 
Governments (1952).   12
laws regulating these professions were first adopted in the 1870s; by the early 1900s, 
most states had enacted some kind of medical or dental licensing regulation. In contrast, 
the earliest laws regulating accountants, architects, and nurses were generally not enacted 
until the 1890s and early 1900s. For these occupations, it was not until the 1910s and 
1920s that the majority of states had enacted licensing legislation.  
 
III. Why Did Licensing Arise? An Empirical Analysis 
  Was licensing regulation adopted to restrict entry into particular occupations in an 
attempt to increase the incomes of professionals? Or were licensing laws introduced to 
reduce asymmetric information about professional quality? Several studies have 
examined the effects of licensing on entry and on the incomes of certain professionals 
(e.g. physicians, dentists, nurses) using more contemporary data but to our knowledge no 
scholarship has analyzed the factors that led to the adoption of initial licensing legislation 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries or the effects of these early licensing 
laws on entry into a wide variety of occupations. Hence, in this section, we exploit cross-
state variation in the timing of licensing legislation for eleven different occupations in 
order to investigate (a) the factors that influenced the adoption of initial licensing 
legislation; and (b) the impact of licensing on the number of workers per capita in a given 
occupation.
12 
  The primary source for our data on licensing is the Council of State Governments 
(1952) study, which reports information on when each state adopted licensing legislation 
for several different occupations.
13 We matched this with data taken from the decennial 
population censuses on the number of workers in each occupation. Because the 
occupational definitions in the population censuses do not always overlap neatly with the 
occupations that were licensed by state governments, we limited our sample to eleven 
occupations (architects, attorneys, barbers, beauticians, dentists, engineers, nurses, 
physicians, plumbers, teachers and veterinarians). This limitation is unfortunate since, as 
                                                 
12 We would also have liked to examine the effect of early licensing laws on the incomes of these eleven 
occupations. Unfortunately, prior to the 1940s, the Census of Population did not include information on 
wages or incomes. In section IV, we use the earliest available data on professional incomes to test whether 
stricter medical licensing laws increased physician incomes in the late 1920s and early 1930s.  
13 For physicians, we use information contained in Baker (1984) on the state medical licensing statutes. 
   13
noted earlier, by the 1950s state governments regulated over 75 different occupations. 
Nevertheless, we believe that these eleven occupations provide us with enough cross-
occupational variation to tell a reasonably comprehensive story about the causes and 
consequences of early licensing laws. We also restricted our attention to the 1880 to 1930 
population censuses because the occupational classifications over these years were most 
consistent (Edwards 1942), and because after 1930, most occupations were already 
licensed by state governments.  
  
Event History Analysis of the Adoption of Licensing Laws 
  To determine what factors motivated state governments to enact licensing 
regulation, we conduct an event history analysis. In particular, we estimate hazard 
regressions of the adoption of licensing legislation. Hazard models are appropriate for 
this purpose because they allow us to exploit the longitudinal structure of our data set. 
Within the class of hazard models, we use the logistic discrete time hazard model. This is 
a sensible choice because the adoption of licensing legislation was a single, non-repeated 
event and because our observations are separated by ten-year intervals along the temporal 
dimension (Allison 1984). 
  The basic regression equation we estimate takes the following form: 
 log[Prt/(1 – Prt)] = λ+ θ(Uit) + π(Lit/Pit) + ρ(Lit/Pit)
2 + εit 
Prt is the probability that occupational licensing legislation for a given occupation is 
adopted by year t; Lit/Pit is the per capita number of individuals working in a given 
occupation in state i in year t; Uit is the urbanization rate in state i in year t; and εit is an 
error term. The per capita population of individuals working in a given occupation is 
included to proxy for producer interests. We also include the square of the per capita 
population of workers in a given occupation to allow for non-linearity in the effect of 
occupational group size. While increases in the per capita size of the occupational group 
may lower the time until licensing is adopted (i.e. increase the licensure hazard), the 
effect of group size may eventually become negative because free riding or coordination 
problems among members of the group reduces its political effectiveness. The 
urbanization rate is included as a proxy of the degree to which exchange was impersonal   14
in each state, and hence, the extent to which asymmetric information was problematic.
14 
We estimated this equation separately for each of the eleven occupations, and pooled 
across all eleven occupations. In the pooled regression, the effects of occupational size 
per capita and its square are constrained to be the same across occupations but each 
occupation has its own fixed effect. The occupational fixed effect indicates whether a 
given occupation is more likely to be regulated sooner or later relative to the average time 
of adoption across all occupations, other things held constant. 
  Table 4 presents the coefficient estimates when the regression equation was 
estimated separately for each of the eleven occupations. For architects, attorneys, 
physicians and veterinarians, urbanization had a positive and statistically significant 
effect on the licensure hazard, indicating that more urban states were more likely to enact 
licensing legislation for these occupations sooner. For the other occupations, the 
coefficient on urbanization is positive but not statistically significant. The per capita 
number of workers in an occupation had a positive and statistically significant effect on 
the licensure hazard for barbers, beauticians, dentists, engineers, nurses, physicians, 
plumbers and veterinarians. Hence, for these occupations, greater producer representation 
increased the probability that licensing would be adopted sooner. 
  Table 5 presents the coefficient estimates from the pooled regression. The 
coefficients on workers per capita, workers per capita squared and urbanization all have 
the predicted signs and are statistically significant. Additionally the occupational fixed 
effects indicate that there were occupational-specific differences in the timing of 
licensing. Barbers are the omitted category and hence the fixed effects should be 
interpreted as the occupational-specific effect on the timing of licensure relative to 
barbers. The coefficients indicate that occupations such as architects, attorneys, dentists, 
                                                 
14 Government officials were aware that specialization and urbanization contributed to problems of 
asymmetric information. For instance, the Council of State Governments (1952, p. 3) made the following 
argument in favor of licensing regulation: "First, in modern urban society, where great multitudes of people 
live under increasingly crowded conditions, government agencies become responsible for ensuring 
adequate knowledge and competence among those ministering to the public health and well-being. This can 
only be accomplished by defining the conditions of admission and retention into the occupations. Second, 
the intense specialization in all fields that is characteristics of complex society often means that the public 
may fail to distinguish between competent and incompetent, honorable and dishonorable practitioners. 
State occupational licensing agencies therefore perform vital functions in protecting the people from fraud 
and dishonesty." 
    15
nurses, physicians, and veterinarians were regulated earlier than barbers whereas 
engineers, plumbers, and teachers were regulated later. 
  The regression results suggest that for most occupations, producer interests were 
an important factor influencing the timing of licensure, and that for certain professions, 
the extent to which exchange was anonymous also affected the timing of licensure. Since 
the producer groups were generally the main proponents of licensing, the statistical 
significance of producer interests in most of the hazard regressions is not altogether 
surprising: producer interests probably stood to gain most from licensing, either because 
they perceived it would function as an entry barrier or because of its potential to reduce 
informational asymmetries and help make a market for their services. That urbanization 
also had a positive and significant effect on the licensure hazard for some professions 
(architects, attorneys, physicians and veterinarians) provides more supporting evidence 
for the asymmetric information hypothesis.
15 In addition, the pooled event history 
analysis suggests that licensing laws were adopted earlier for those professions such as 
dentists, physicians and veterinarians whose markets were more likely to suffer from 
problems of asymmetric information. 
 
Effect of licensure on entry 
  In this section we conduct an empirical investigation of the effect of early state 
occupational licensing laws on entry into these eleven occupations. The basic fixed effect 
regression equation we estimate is as follows: 
(1)  Lit/Pit = µ + Si + Yt + αRit + Xitβ + εit 
Pit denotes the population of state i in year t; Lit denotes the number of workers in a 
particular occupation in state i in year t; Si denotes a fixed-effect for state i; Yt denotes a 
fixed-effect for year t; Rit denotes a binary variable that is equal to 1 in all years t in 
which occupational licensing is in place in state i and 0 otherwise; and Xit denotes a 
                                                 
15 One potential problem with the urbanization variable is that it might be correlated with political activity 
among professionals. If the per capita number of workers is correlated with urbanization, then collinearity 
between urbanization and the per capita number of workers may explain why urbanization is not significant 
in some of the regressions. To check for this possibility, we re-estimated the regression equations for those 
occupations where urbanization was not significant excluding the number of workers per capita and its 
square and we still found that urbanization was not significant. Hence, the failure of urbanization to be 
significant in these regressions is unlikely to be a consequence of collinearity among the independent 
variables.   16
vector of time-varying control variables for state i in year t. The two time-varying state-
level control variables we include are (a) the urbanization rate; and (b) real income per 
capita.
16 We include these variables because both were likely to influence the per capita 
number of workers in each occupation. The variable of interest in this regression, α, is 
the coefficient on the regulation dummy variable. If α < 0 then regulation reduced the 
number of individuals employed in a particular occupation. If, on the other hand, α ≥ 0, 
then regulation either had no impact on entry or increased the entry of individuals into a 
particular occupation. 
  We also examine the effect of occupational licensing on entry by estimating a 
“dynamic” version of equation (1) which takes the following form: 
(2)   (%∆Lit) = γ + Si + Yt + δ(%∆Pit) + αRit + νit  
In regression equation (2), the dependent variable is %∆Lit, which is the growth rate 
between adjacent census years (approximated, for our purposes, by the first difference in 
the natural logarithm) in the number of individuals working in a given occupation. As 
before, α is the coefficient of interest. If α < 0, then occupational licensing regulation 
reduced the growth rate of the number of persons in a given occupation (i.e. reduced the 
rate of entry). On the other hand, if α ≥ 0, then occupational licensing had no impact or 
increased the growth rate of the number of persons working in a given occupation (i.e. 
did not affect or increased entry). 
  Our analysis from the previous section suggests that there is potentially an 
endogeneity problem with respect to Rit, the regulation binary variable, and our 
dependent variables. The hazard regressions indicated that an increase in the per capita 
number of workers in a given occupation increased the likelihood that occupational 
licensing regulation would be enacted. As a result, a positive correlation exists between 
the regulation binary variable and the error term in equations (1) and (2), which implies 
that ordinary least squares estimates of the coefficient on the regulation binary variable 
will be biased.
17 To address this problem, we instrument for occupational licensing 
                                                 
16 Data on real income per capita at the state level are taken from Kuznets and Brady (1965). Values for 
1890 and 1910 were imputed. 
17 To some degree the fixed effect framework should deal with the problem of correlation between the 
regulation indicator variable and the error term. If the state fixed-effects are capturing unmeasured 
correlations between the regulation variable and the error, then the coefficient on the regulation binary   17
regulation. The particular variable we use to instrument for regulation of a given 
occupation is an index variable that equals the number of other occupations licensed by a 
given state in a given year.
18  This is an excellent instrument since it is likely to be 
correlated with the probability that licensing regulation of a given occupation is enacted 
but not with the per capita number of workers in that given occupation.
19 Using this 
variable as an instrument for occupational licensing regulation for each occupation, we 
also estimate equations (1) and (2) by two-stage least squares.  
  Table 6 presents ordinary least squares (OLS) and two stage least squares (2SLS) 
regression estimates of the effects of licensing regulation on the number of workers per 
1,000 persons for each occupation. In none of the regressions is the coefficient on the 
regulation binary variable negative and significant; early licensing laws do not appear to 
have reduced the per capita number of workers in any of these occupations, regardless of 
whether we estimate these regressions by OLS or by 2SLS. For beauticians the 
coefficient on the regulation dummy is positive and significant in both the 2SLS and OLS 
regressions suggesting that regulation increased entry into this occupation. In the 2SLS 
regressions, we find that the coefficient on the regulation variable is negative but not 
significant for architects, dentists, nurses, physicians, plumbers, and teachers, and 
positive but not significant for attorneys, barbers, engineers, and veterinarians. The 
control variables in each of the regression equations generally have plausible signs. For 
nearly every occupation, urbanization and real per capita income are positively correlated 
with the number of workers per 1,000.  
  However, since the enactment of licensing regulation is more likely to have an 
impact on the rate of entry over time, the dynamic version of the entry restriction 
regression model is likely to be more informative. Table 7 reports the OLS and 2SLS 
                                                                                                                                                 
variable should be “less positive” when fixed effects are included. We estimated both equations (1) and (2) 
with and without fixed effects and found that for most occupations, the coefficient on the regulation 
dummy variable was significantly smaller with state fixed effects than without them. Hence, we believe 
that the fixed effect framework goes some way in dealing with this problem.   
18 Since we have information on the licensing of eleven occupations, our index variable takes on values 
from 0 to 10.  
19 For instance, to instrument for whether physicians were regulated in 1910 in Alabama we construct an 
index variable that is equal to the total number of other occupations (excluding physicians) licensed by 
Alabama in 1910. This index variable should be correlated with the probability that physicians were 
licensed in Alabama in 1910, but not with the per capita number of physicians or the growth rate of 
physicians in Alabama.    18
regression estimates of equation (2) for each occupation. While the OLS estimates 
suggest that regulation only had a negative and significant effect on the growth rate in the 
number of architects and veterinarians, the 2SLS estimates suggest that regulation also 
had a negative and significant effect on the growth rate of physicians and dentists. For 
beauticians, the coefficient on the regulation variable is positive and significant, but for 
the remaining occupations, the coefficient on the regulation variable is insignificant. 
Hence, while regulation may have functioned as an entry barrier for architects, dentists, 
physicians, and veterinarians, it did not function in this way for the rest of the 
occupations in our sample. 
  The regression results therefore suggest that the occupational licensing laws 
enacted during turn of the century America were negatively correlated with entry for a 
handful of occupations. For most occupations, licensing did not reduce entry, perhaps 
because the standards set by most early licensing statutes were not very strict, or because 
enforcement of early licensing laws was weak. However, it is interesting to note that 
licensing had a negative effect on entry on physicians, dentists, and veterinarians—
professions whose services tended to be purchased directly by consumers and for which 
the costs associated with low quality service were potentially greatest—and that licensing 
did not have a negative effect on entry for engineers and teachers, whose services were 
generally purchased by firms, or barbers and beauticians, for which the costs of obtaining 
low quality service were not substantial.
20  
 
IV. Case study of the medical profession 
  We focus on the medical profession for several reasons. First, licensing 
regulations were rarely static for physicians and it is important to determine which types 
of regulations were most effective for limiting entry. Second, the availability of data on 
physician incomes allows us to investigate whether state licensing led to higher incomes. 
Third, data on health outcomes (i.e. disease-specific mortality rates) can be used to 
provide a sharper test of whether licensing increased physician quality or reduced 
competition. Fourth, it is interesting to examine whether medical licensing regulation 
                                                 
20 From this perspective, architects are an outlier, since their services tend to be purchased by firms, rather 
than individuals and we do find that licensing reduced entry into architecture.   19
affected the incidence of medical malpractice suits. Finally, because the medical 
profession was (and continues to be) more strictly regulated than other professions, it is 
important to determine whether medical licensing improved quality of physician services 
or merely restricted entry and reduced competition. 
  Our data on the nature of medical licensing legislation from 1870 to 1930 is taken 
from Baker (1984) and from the American Medical Association’s (AMA) Council on 
Medical Education. For each state we know (i) the year in which the initial licensing law 
was enacted; (ii) the year a state licensing board was introduced; (iii) the year in which a 
state licensing exam was required for new medical license applicants; (iv) the year in 
which a two-year pre-medical college requirement was introduced; (v) the year in which 
the length of the medical degree was required to be at least four years long; (vi) the year 
in which an internship requirement was imposed; and (vii) the year in which a basic 
science requirement was introduced. By incorporating information on these seven 
licensing requirements in a regression framework, we hope to control more fully for 
changes in the nature of medical licensing legislation over time.  
  Our basic empirical strategy is simple. As before, we match our information on 
licensing with data on the outcomes that are of interest to us (per capita number of 
physicians, physician’s incomes, disease specific-mortality rates, and the incidence of 
malpractice suits) and we exploit cross-state variation in licensing to estimate the effect 
of medical licensing laws on these outcomes in a fixed-effect regression framework. 
Because our outcome measures are not always available for every state or for the full 
sample period (1880-1930), sample sizes do vary across regressions. Nevertheless, we 
believe that the data are rich enough to furnish a nuanced picture of the effects of medical 
licensing laws.   
 
Effects of medical licensing laws on entry 
  Table 8 presents OLS regression estimates of the effects of particular medical 
licensing requirements on the number of physicians per 1,000 from 1880 to 1930. In the 
first column we measure licensing by including a binary variable for each of the seven 
medical licensing requirements. In second column we construct two separate indices to 
measure early licensing and later licensing requirements separately. Early licensing   20
requirements were the initial licensing law and the introduction of a state board. These 
requirements were generally introduced prior to 1900. To index for these early 
requirements we summed the binary variables that indicate whether a state had an initial 
law and whether the state had a licensing board. Later licensing requirements were those 
introduced after 1900 (licensing exam, four year medical school requirement, two year 
premedical college requirement, internship requirement, and the science requirement). 
The index for these later requirements is a sum of the binary variables that indicate 
whether the state had introduced these requirements by a given year. Finally, in column 
(3), we construct a composite licensing index to measure the overall strictness of a state’s 
medical licensing laws. This index is simply the sum of each of the individual binary 
variables. Since there are seven requirements, this index takes on values between 0 and 7. 
As before, we also control for the real per capita income in each state and the 
urbanization rate in each state to account for other factors that might have influenced the 
number of physicians per capita.  
  When we control for each licensing requirement separately (column 1), we find 
that the introduction of a two-year premedical college requirement and the four-year 
medical school requirement had a negative and statistically significant impact on the 
number of physicians per 1,000 persons. Thus, the licensing requirements that restricted 
entry were those that were most likely to improve physician quality. When we index 
separately for early and later medical licensing requirements, (column 2) we find that 
earlier requirements had a positive and significant effect on the number of physicians per 
1,000, while later requirements had a negative and significant impact. Hence, it seems 
that those licensing requirements that were introduced in the post 1900 period were those 
that were most negatively correlated with entry.
21 Finally, when we use the composite 
licensing index to measure overall licensing strictness (column 3), we find that stricter 
medical licensing reduced the number of physicians per 1,000. Thus, the evidence 
presented in this set of regressions suggests that medical licensing requirements, 
                                                 
21 Superficially, this would appear to be inconsistent with our analysis in the previous section, which found 
that initial state licensing regulation reduced entry into medicine. We believe that this is a consequence of 
the fact that the stricter licensing standards were correlated over time with initial legislation. 
    21
particularly those introduced in the early decades of the twentieth century, reduced entry 
into medicine.  
 
Effects of medical licensing laws on physician incomes 
  Perhaps the most highly cited evidence supporting the industry capture 
explanation for professional licensing comes from the classic study by Friedman and 
Kuznets (1945). Using survey data on the incomes of physicians and dentists from 1929 
to 1932, Friedman and Kuznets found that at a national level, average physician incomes 
were higher than average dentist incomes. Even after adjusting for the fact that it took 
longer to become a physician, physicians appeared to earn a premium relative to dentists. 
Based on this evidence, Friedman and Kuznets attributed this premium to medical 
licensing regulations that were enacted in response to lobbying by the AMA. In this 
section, we use the same data on professional incomes to examine whether licensing 
regulations increased average physician earnings. However, unlike Friedman and 
Kuznets, we examine whether cross-state variation in physician incomes as well as the 
ratio of physician to dentist incomes can be explained by variation in the strictness of 
medical licensing regulation across states.  
  The data on physician and dental incomes are taken from US Senate (1934). For 
each state, we know the total earnings of physicians and the number of physicians 
surveyed. Hence, we divide the total earnings of physicians in each state by the number 
of physicians surveyed to obtain a measure of average physician earnings and we 
converted these figures to real 1967 dollars using the CPI. We then matched this data 
with our information on state-level medical licensing legislation from 1929 to 1932 to 
estimate the impact of stricter medical licensing regulation on physician earnings. Since, 
by 1929, cross state variation in medical licensing regulation was limited to variation in 
(1) whether the state had a basic science requirement; (2) whether the state had an 
internship requirement; and (3) whether the state had a premedical college requirement of 
two years, we restricted our attention to these dimensions of licensing. Because the 
overall level of income in the state, as well as the extent to which the state was urban may   22
have influenced physician incomes, we also include the urbanization rate and the level of 
personal income per capita.
22  
   The onset of the Great Depression may make it difficult to make clean inferences 
about the effect of medical licensing on physician income. The inclusion of information 
on real personal income per capita in each state serves as a partial solution to this 
problem since physician incomes probably declined along with personal incomes during 
this period. Nevertheless we also include year fixed-effects to control for any nationwide 
shocks to physician earnings that may have been induced by the Depression.  As an 
alternative solution to this problem, we also examine the impact of medical licensing 
laws on the ratio of average physician earnings to average dentist earnings in each state.
23 
By using the ratio of physician to dentist earnings, we hope to sweep out state-specific 
variation in incomes resulting from macroeconomic events. 
  Columns (1) and (2) in Table 9 display fixed effect OLS regression estimates of 
the impact of medical licensing legislation on the natural logarithm of average physician 
incomes from 1929-32. We estimate the effects of licensing on both gross and net 
physician incomes. We report regression results using the licensing index variable to 
measure licensing strictness. Qualitatively similar results were obtained when we 
controlled separately for the various medical licensing requirements.  
  Surprisingly, the regression coefficients reported in columns (1) and (2) indicate 
that stricter medical licensing requirements did not have a significant impact on average 
gross or average net physician earnings. We also investigate the effects of stricter medical 
licensing requirements on average physician to average dentist incomes in columns (3) 
and (4). The coefficient on the medical licensing index variable in columns (3) and (4) is 
not statistically significant, suggesting that licensing also had no effect on the physician 
to dentist income ratio, regardless of whether we use gross or net income. Hence, cross-
                                                 
22 Urbanization and real per capita personal income are somewhat collinear. Qualitatively similar 
coefficient estimates were obtained when we control for only urbanization but not real per capita income 
(and vice versa). 
23 An examination of the effects of licensing on the ratio of physician to dentist incomes is potentially 
problematic if (a) dental licensing requirements were changing during the period of study, or if (b) dental 
licensing varied significantly across states. The available evidence suggests that in the late 1920s and early 
1930s, dental licensing requirements did not change much (Friedman and Kuznets 1945; Fraundorf 1984). 
The inclusion of state fixed-effects should control for any cross-sectional variation in dental licensing 
across states.     23
state variation in the same data set used by Friedman and Kuznets does not support their 
claim that licensing raised physician earnings. Despite the fact that licensing regulations, 
especially those that lengthened physician training, restricted entry into medical practice, 
we are unable to find evidence that these same regulations increased physician incomes. 
 
Effects of medical licensing on state-level mortality rates 
  In this section we analyze the correlation between licensing and quality by 
investigating the relationship between physician licensing and mortality.
24 In the early 
1900s, the Census Bureau began to collect disease-specific mortality data at the level of 
individual states and cities (US Bureau of the Census). By matching this information with 
our data on state medical licensing regulations, we can estimate the impact of licensing 
on state mortality rates. Because most of our independent variables are only available at 
ten year intervals, we collected state level mortality statistics for 1900, 1910, 1920, and 
1930. 
  Since estimates of impact of medical licensing regulation on mortality rates may 
be subject to an endogeneity problem, we take the following empirical strategy.
25 First, 
we include state fixed effects in our analysis in order to sweep out any state-specific 
factors (for instance, state-specific investments in public health) that may have influenced 
mortality rates in a given state. Second, we include real per capita income and 
urbanization as control variables. Urbanization controls for the fact that the disease 
environment was different in urban areas than in rural areas. Real per capita income is 
included to proxy for nutritional quality; presumably, average nutrition was better in 
states with higher real incomes. Third, we examine the impact of licensing not only on 
                                                 
24 A large and growing body of scholarship has been devoted to analyzing the determinants of mortality in 
America during the twentieth century (Fogel 1994; Preston 1996; Costa and Steckel 1997; Haines 2001). In 
general, little attention has been paid to the role that medical licensing and improvements in physician 
quality may have played in reducing mortality rates. 
25 One might imagine that states that were more likely to enact stricter medical licensing requirements were 
also those states that were more “health conscious.” “Health conscious” states may have differed from 
other states not only in terms of their willingness to adopt stricter medical licensing regulations, but also in 
terms of their level of public health and/or nutrition. Presumably, the citizens of “health conscious” states 
enjoyed above average nutrition and were also more willing to invest in public health infrastructure. Hence, 
mortality may therefore tend to be lower in “health conscious” states, not because stricter licensing 
improved physician quality, but rather, because investments in public health and better nutrition have 
altered the disease environment in these states and/or the ability of individuals in these states to fight 
disease.    24
overall mortality rates, but also on a few disease-specific mortality rates. While public 
health investments and/or nutrition may have heavily influenced the probability of dying 
from certain diseases (for instance, cholera or influenza), the likelihood of dying from 
other diseases (for instance, appendicitis) may be completely unrelated to nutrition and/or 
public health. 
  We collected data on six different mortality rates: the overall mortality rate, 
cancer mortality rate, diabetes mortality rate, infant mortality rate, maternal mortality 
rate, and appendicitis mortality rate. To measure the strictness of medical licensing in 
each state, we used our composite medical licensing index.  Table 10 presents OLS 
regression estimates of the determinants of these six mortality rates. In each regression 
we control for the urbanization rate in each state, real income per capita, the strictness of 
medical licensing regulation, state fixed-effects, and the number of physicians per 1,000 
persons.
26  
  The coefficient estimates of the effects of licensing on mortality suggest that 
licensing, by increasingly the quality of physicians, lowered mortality rates due to those 
illnesses where physician quality is likely to have mattered during this period. While 
stricter medical licensing did not have a significant impact on overall mortality rates, 
cancer mortality rates, or diabetes mortality rates, they appear to have significantly 
reduced rates of infant mortality, maternal mortality, and appendicitis mortality.
27 Stricter 
licensing should have little effect on overall mortality rates since many causes of death 
were beyond the control of physicians during this period. In particular, licensing should 
not affect cancer mortality since the state of medical science at this time was such that 
even the best physicians were powerless to affect cancer mortality. Increases in physician 
quality did not significantly lower mortality rates due to diabetes in spite of the fact that 
the invention of insulin in 1922 provided physicians with a means for treating this illness. 
However, stricter licensing does seem to have reduced infant and maternal mortality rates 
since well trained physicians during this period may have been better able to deal with 
                                                 
26 We include the number of physicians per 1,000 persons to control for variation in physician access. 
27 Qualitatively similar results were obtained when we used the lagged value of the composite licensing 
index to control for physician quality.   25
complications arising from childbirth.
28 Finally, states with stricter licensing had lower 
appendicitis mortality rates. This period witnessed dramatic improvements in basic 
surgery due to advances in antiseptics. Since the onset of appendicitis is more or less 
random, this estimate is least likely to be influenced by an endogeneity bias. 
  The coefficients on the remaining control variables are worth discussing briefly. 
While the urbanization variable is generally not significant, it appears that the lack of 
significance of urbanization is due to the inclusion of state fixed effects. When we omit 
the fixed effects in the regressions, the urbanization coefficient generally becomes 
significant with the correct sign and the signs and significance levels of the other 
variables remain unchanged. Real income per capita has a negative and significant impact 
on overall mortality and infant mortality, a positive and significant effect on appendicitis 
and diabetes mortality, and a positive but not significant impact on maternal and cancer 
mortality. That higher real income per capita should reduce overall mortality and infant 
mortality is unsurprising since nutrition (and hence the ability to fight infection) was 
probably increasing with income. The absence of a significant correlation between cancer 
and real income also seems reasonable. The positive and significant correlation between 
real per capita income and diabetes and appendicitis mortality is somewhat puzzling, but 
the size of these coefficients is small. 
The coefficient on physicians per 1,000 persons, which proxies for physician 
access, is positive but not significant in the overall mortality rate regression; negative but 
not significant in the cancer, infant, and maternal mortality rate regressions; and negative 
and significant in the diabetes and appendicitis mortality rate regressions. While access to 
a physician may not have been important for overall mortality or cancer mortality (since 
physicians were powerless to treat most illnesses at this time), it may have been 
important for diabetes mortality (since physicians were important conveyors of insulin 
treatment) and appendicitis mortality (since surgery requires access to a physician). 
Finally, access to physicians may not have been critical for infant or maternal mortality 
rates because of the availability of midwives as a substitute, although it is worth noting 
                                                 
28 Collins and Thomasson (2002) examine whether the racial gap in infant mortality rates from 1920 to 
1970 at the state level can be explained by differences in income, urbanization, women’s education and 
physicians per capita.   26
that physician quality (as proxied by the licensing index) did matter for these causes of 
mortality.   
 
Effects of medical licensing regulation on state-level appellate court malpractice suits 
  In this section, we examine the relationship between state medical licensing 
requirements and the incidence of medical malpractice suits. In principle, if licensing 
requirements increased physician quality, then one might expect to observe a reduction in 
the number of malpractice suits in response to medical licensing legislation. However, the 
frequency of medical malpractice suits seems to have increased dramatically over the 
Progressive Era. According to De Ville (1990), the growth in malpractice suits during 
this period was caused by competition among physicians of different sects as well as 
dramatic advances in medical technology. 
  Our data on malpractice cases is taken from Smith (1941c), who reports the 
number of appeals court cases on medical malpractice over each decade and in each state 
from 1790 to 1940. We restrict our attention to the data from 1880 to 1930 since this 
overlaps with our data on medical licensing regulations. Ideally we would have liked to 
use data on the total number of malpractice cases rather than merely the number of cases 
reaching state appeals courts. However, to the extent that the number of malpractice cases 
reaching state appeals courts is positively correlated with the total number of malpractice 
cases in a given state, the data reported in Smith (1941c) should serve as a reasonable 
proxy for the incidence of malpractice suits in each state. 
  Since we expect that the number of malpractice cases should be greater in more 
populous states, we normalize Smith’s data by state population (in millions) to obtain our 
dependent variable. Because Smith reports the number of appellate court malpractice 
cases filed over a decade, our dependent variable is the cumulative number of appellate 
court cases in a given state over the decade per million persons in a given state at the 
beginning of the decade. As control variables, we include state fixed effects, the number 
of physicians per 1,000 persons, the urbanization rate, real per capita income, and 
medical licensing variables. Our time varying control variables (physicians per 1,000, 
urbanization, real per capita income, and medical licensing) are matched with the 
dependent variable so they control for conditions as they existed at the beginning of the   27
decade. We also include a time trend to sweep out factors that may have contributed to an 
overall rise in litigation during this period. 
  Fixed effect OLS regression estimates of the determinants of medical malpractice 
are displayed in Table 11. In column (1), we use separate binary variables to control for 
each of our seven medical licensing requirements. Surprisingly, the data indicate that 
certain licensing requirements—specifically, the presence of a licensing exam and the 
four year medical degree requirement—significantly increased the incidence of medical 
malpractice suits. In columns (2), (3) and (4) we group the medical licensing 
requirements in different ways and continue to find a positive and significant relationship 
between medical licensing and the frequency of medical malpractice suits.
29 Thus, 
despite the fact that licensing is likely to have raised overall physician quality, licensing 
led to an increase rather than a decrease in medical malpractice suits.
30 
  We believe that there is a plausible explanation for why licensing may have 
increased the incidence of medical malpractice suits. Throughout the Progressive Era, as 
well as for most of the modern period, the courts ruled on medical malpractice suits based 
on standards of care available in a given locality (De Ville 1990). When licensing 
                                                 
29 In order to determine whether the lack of significance of some of these medical licensing requirements 
was due to collinearity among these binary variables, we grouped together the requirements in various 
ways. In column (2) we control for the presence of an exam and the four year medical degree requirement 
separately, but we group the initial licensing law and state board together, and the college, internship, and 
science requirements together. In this regression, the index variable that measures the college, internship, 
and science requirements jointly is now positive and significant, as are the licensing exam and four year 
medical school requirement. Hence, this regression suggests that the college, internship, and science 
requirements may also have contributed to a rise in the incidence of medical malpractice suits. However, 
the index that measures the presence of an initial licensing law and a state board is still not significant. In 
column (3) we group licensing requirements into two categories: early requirements (initial law and the 
presence of a state board) and later requirements (the remaining five requirements). We find that later 
requirements had a positive and significant effect on the incidence of malpractice suits, but early 
requirements did not. Finally, in column (4), we combine all of these medical licensing requirements into a 
composite licensing index to measure the overall strictness of licensing regulations and find that increases 
in the index increased the incidence of malpractice suits. In each regression the Durbin-Watson statistic is 
close to 2, which indicates that serial correlation in the residuals is unlikely to be problematic. 
30 The positive correlation we observe between licensing and the incidence of medical malpractice suits 
may be biased if stricter licensing laws were adopted in response to increases in the frequency of medical 
malpractice suits. To test for this source of endogeneity, we estimated a regression of the composite 
licensing index in a given state in year t + 10 on the number of malpractice cases per million over the 
decade between t and t + 10 and the other control variables discussed earlier. In this regression, the 
coefficient on the number of malpractice cases per decade per million persons was negative but not 
significantly different from zero, which suggests that stricter licensing requirements were not enacted in 
response to malpractice cases. Qualitatively similar results were obtained when other measures of licensing 
were used in place of the composite licensing index as the dependent variable. Hence, we believe we can 
rule out this source of endogeneity bias.   28
requirements did not exist, the standards of local practice were difficult to define because 
anyone could legally call himself a physician. Licensing regulations, by better defining 
the standards of local practice, may have made it easier for patients to successfully sue 
physicians. In this vein, it is noteworthy that Smith (1941a-d) finds that most medical 
malpractice suits were filed against ordinary physicians rather than quacks. While 
medical licensing may have eliminated “charlatans” and “quacks,” it probably did not 
eliminate all incompetent doctors. Licensing legislation may therefore have increased the 
incidence of medical malpractice suits because it made it less costly for consumers to sue 
negligent and unqualified doctors for poor outcomes. 
 
V. Conclusions 
  The Progressive Era marked the transition period when the United States was 
transformed from a traditional to a modern society. During this period, with advances in 
science and knowledge based on ever increasing specialization, modern professionals 
emerged in numerous occupations. As the spatial organization of society moved away 
from one based on villages and small towns to large urban areas, market exchanges 
became more impersonal and anonymous. Specialization and the rise of impersonal 
exchange were accompanied by an expansion of the role of government in the economy. 
In this paper, we examine why state governments began to regulate the professional labor 
market at this time. 
  We believe that the emergence of professional licensing regulation during the 
Progressive Era was motivated by a desire to improve the market for professional 
services. During this period, the growth of specialization and impersonal exchange gave 
rise to “lemons” problems in the market for professional services. But, because private 
mechanisms alone could not eliminate all unqualified practitioners from the market, it 
was necessary for state governments to enact regulations that set standards of 
qualification to practice these occupations. Our analysis finds that licensing legislations 
were adopted earlier and were more likely to restrict entry into professions where 
informational asymmetries were most likely to be problematic. In addition, a detailed 
study of the effects of medical licensing shows that licensing regulation did not raise 
physician incomes but may have increased physician quality.    29
  When the Council of State Governments met in 1951 to request a survey of the 
professional and occupational licensing practices of states, it was aware that state 
licensing powers could be used not only as an instrument to "protect the safety and 
welfare" of consumers, but also as a device to create "monopoly conditions." However, 
when the survey was reported in 1952, the Council reached no definitive conclusions 
regarding which of these forces was more important. While we believe that the evidence 
from the Progressive Era is more consistent with a public interest explanation for 
licensing regulation than one based on industry capture, we, like the skeptical midwestern 
Governor quoted in our introduction, cannot dismiss the fact that licensing regulations 
also "lay the foundation for creating monopolies that inhibit market competition" 
(Council of State Governments 1952, p. 1). We hope that future scholars will take up the 
task to determine if and when licensing regulations became a tool to advance the narrow 
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Table 1: Specialization among scientific periodicals, 1780-1900 
 
A. Number of periodicals by scientific field 
 
 1780  1800  1820  1840  1860  1880  1900 
General science  27  34  45  69  124  181  218 
Astronomy 0  1  1  3  6  9  23 
Botany 0  2  3  11  22  33  59 
Chemistry 1  7  7  14  18  25  48 
Experimental biology  0  1  1  2  11  21  49 
Geography 0  0  0  5  12  20  28 
Geology 0  2  6  15  28  46  79 
Mathematics 0  0  1  3  8  28  45 
Natural history  2  3  5  20  40  60  72 
Physics 0  1  1  3  4  11  25 
Zoology 0  0  2  14  27  52  109 
Other 0  0  0  1  4  19  38 
Total 30  51  72  160  304  505  793 
 
B. Percentage of periodicals by scientific field 
 
  1780  1800  1820  1840  1860 1880 1900 
General  science  90.0  66.6  62.5  43.1  40.8 35.8 27.5 
Astronomy    0 2.0  1.4  1.9  2.0 1.8 2.9 
Botany  0 3.9  4.2  6.8  7.2 6.5 7.4 
Chemistry  3.3  13.7  9.7  8.8  6.0 5.0 6.0 
Experimental  biology  0 2.0  1.4  1.2  3.6 4.1 6.2 
Geography  0  0  0 3.1  3.9 4.0 3.5 
Geology 0  3.9  8.3  9.4  9.2  9.1  10.0 
Mathematics  0  0 1.4  1.9  2.6 5.5 5.7 
Natural history  6.7  5.9  6.9  12.5  13.2  11.9  9.1 
Physics  0 2.0  1.4  1.9  1.3 2.2 3.2 
Zoology 0  0  2.8  8.8  8.9  10.3  13.7 
Other  0  0  0 0.6  1.3 3.8 4.8 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 100 100 
 
Source: Adopted from the tables contained in Part 3 of Gascoigne (1985).   
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Table 2: Mid-twentieth century specialization in scientific knowledge 
 
A. Pure scientific fields 
 
 Approximate  number  of 
periodicals in field 
Year Source 
Astronomy 650  periodicals  "not 
known to have ceased 
publication" 
1958  Crane, Louis F. (1958). An International 
Bibliography of Current Astronomical 




5,000 “current titles”  1960  "Biological Abstracts List of Serials,” 
Biological Abstracts, 35: 4703-4742 
Chemistry  1,560 "current and 
discontinued titles" 
1960  Chemical Society (1960). Periodicals in the 
Chemical Society Library. London 
Geography 
 
657 “current titles”  1961  Royal Geographical Society (1961). Current 
Geographical Periodicals: A Hand-list and 
Subject Index of Current Periodicals in the 
Library of the RGS. London: RGS 
Mathematics 
 




850 “current titles”  1950  Bray, Robert S (1950). List of Periodicals of 
Physics Interest. Washington DC: Office of 
Technical Services 
 
B. Scientific professions 
 
 Approximate  number  of 
periodicals in field 
Year Source 
Dentistry  1,255 "current and 
discontinued titles" 
1962  Schmidt, Hans Joachim (1962). List of Dental 
Periodicals. Stuttgart-Degerlock: Verlag der 




553 "current titles"  1953  Association of College and Reference 
Libraries (1953). A Recommended List of 
Basic Periodicals in Engineering and 
Engineering Sciences. Chicago: ACRL. 
Medicine 
 




935 "current and 
discontinued periodicals"
1963  Andrews, Theodora (1963). World List of 
Pharmacy Periodicals. Washington, DC: 




570 "current titles"  1961  Commonwealth Bureau of Animal Health 
(1961). “List of Publications Searched by the 
Commonwealth Bureau of Animal Health.” 
Veterinary Bulletin 31: i-ix. 
 
Source: Information in this table is taken from Fowler (1966)Table 3: The timing of licensing regulations: number of states enacting licensing regulation by 10 year interval for selected 
occupations, 1870-1950 
 
Profession Pre  1870  1871-80 1881-90 1891-1900 1901-10 1911-20 1921-30 1931-40 1941-50 Timing  Unknown  Total 
Accountants       3  18  25  1  1      48 
Architects       1  6  11  12  10  6    46 
Attorneys  10 1 1  4  5 2 5 4    16  48 
Barbers        2  11 1 12  15 1  4  46 
Beauticians            1 20  21 3    45 
Chiropractors       1    17  21  4  1    44 
Dentists  2 4  21 10  5 4 1 1      48 
Electricians        1  2     2  4  9 
Engineers         1  10  14  15  8    48 
Insurance  Brokers  1      1  3 8 1 3    5  22 
Midwives        4  2 5 1 1    1  14 
Practical  Nurses          5 2 1 1  15  8  32 
Registered Nurses          23  20  4  1      48 
Optometrists         15  21  5  1    6  48 
Osteopaths       8  19  8  3    1  8  47 
Pharmacists   7  24  10 4  1  2     48 
Physical  therapists           1  1  2  5  9 
Physicians  5  15  22  6          48 
Plumbers         2  2    3  6  3  16 
Psychologists             3    3 
Real Estate Brokers            6  23  6  5    40 
Surveyors          2 4 3 3 1  20  33 
Teachers  10 1 2  2  2 4 1      26  48 
Veterinarians     2  7 15  11  3     10  48 
 
Source: Adopted from Table A in Council of State Governments (1952). For physicians, the data are taken from Baker (1984). 
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No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Log-
likelihood 
-93.13 -93.04 -38.56 -35.41 -76.39 -56.73 -37.48 -35.63 -86.93 -73.53 -75.13 












































































































Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Log-
likelihood 
-50.59 -89.09 -64.73 -89.44 -77.07 -23.11 -21.22 -23.35 -21.33 -83.03 -67.89 
N  312 268 268 162 162 308 308  57  57  197 197 
 Notes: The coefficient estimates show the change in the log-odds of adopting licensing legislation for a given occupation resulting from a one-unit change in the 
variable. Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels is denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported 
in parenthesis.  Table 5: Pooled hazard model estimates of the factors influencing the timing of licensing 
regulation, 1880-1930 
 
 Dependent  Variable: 





















Occupation fixed effects 













































Notes: The coefficient estimates show the change in the log-odds of adopting licensing legislation for a 
given occupation resulting from a one-unit change in the variable Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels is denoted by *, **, and *** 
respectively.  
Table 6: Effects of occupational licensing regulation on the number of workers per 1,000 persons for eleven different occupations, 
1880-1930 
 






































































































2  0.77 0.64  0.84 0.84 0.68  0.72 0.46  0.31 0.84 0.92  0.69 
N  275 163  271 283 283  283 284  283 271 132  236 
 






































































































2  0.76  0.60  0.82 0.67 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.30 0.83 0.88 0.73 
N  275  163  271 283 283 283 284 284 271 132 236 
Notes: State-fixed effects were included. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels is 
denoted by *, **, and *** respectively.   
Table 7: Effects of occupational licensing regulation on the growth rate of workers in eleven different occupations, 1880-1930 
 














































































2  0.39  0.28 0.16  0.06 0.37 0.05 0.18 0.40 0.64  0.08 0.54 
N  262  162 270  254 274 274 210 282 265  132 224 
 














































































2  0.38  0.27  0.11  0.23  0.33  0.04 0.17 0.24  0.42 0.07  0.30 
N  262  262  270  254  274  274 210 282  282 132  224 
 
Notes: State-fixed effects were included. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels is 
denoted by *, **, and *** respectively.Table 8: Effects of medical licensing requirements on the number of physicians per 1,000 
persons, 1880-1930 
 

























































































   -0.04*** 
(0.01) 
Adjusted-R
2  0.70 0.68 0.64 
N  282 282 282 
Notes: State fixed effects were included. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in 















Ratio of Gross Physician to Gross 




Ratio of Net Physician 








































2 0.22  0.23  0.92  0.82 
N 192  192  192  192 
 
Notes: State fixed-effects were included but are not reported. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 
1 percent levels is denoted by *, **, and *** respectively.    44
Table 10: Effects of medical licensing requirements on state level mortality rates due to different causes, 1900-1930 
 





































































































2  0.25  0.9  0.80 0.86 0.88 0.67 
N  111  108  80 65 69  100 
 
Notes: State fixed effects were included in each regression. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
a Since insulin treatment was only developed in 1922, we restricted our sample to diabetes mortality rates in 1920 and 1930 for this regression.  
b The infant mortality rate is expressed as the number of deaths of children less than 1 year old per 1,000 children 1 year of age or less. Estimates of the number 
of children 1 year of age or less were not available for every state in the registration area; hence, the sample size is smaller for this regression. 
c The maternal mortality rate is expressed as the number of deaths due to childbirth per 1,000 live births. This data were only available for selected states in 1920 
and 1930; hence the sample size is smaller for this regression 
d Data on deaths due to appendicitis were only available for 1910, 1920, and 1930; hence, the sample size is smaller for this regression. Table 11: Effects of medical licensing requirements on the number of state-level appeals 
court malpractice cases per 1 million persons for each decade, 1880-1930  
 


















































    




    











    











    




    
Early requirements 












(3, 4, 5, 6, 7) 






     1.09*** 
(0.23) 
Adjusted-R
2 0.38  0.39  0.39  0.39 
D-W statistic  1.96  1.95  1.95  1.95 
N 282  282  282  282 
 
Notes: State fixed effects and a time trend were included. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are 
displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels is denoted by *, **, and 
*** respectively.   
 